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Abstract We propose a coin-flip protocol which yields a string of strong,
random coins and is fully simulatable against poly-sized quantum adver-
saries on both sides. It can be implemented with quantum-computational
security without any set-up assumptions, since our construction only as-
sumes mixed commitment schemes which we show how to construct in
the given setting. We then show that the interactive generation of random
coins at the beginning or during outer protocols allows for quantum-
secure realizations of classical schemes, again without any set-up as-
sumptions. As example applications we discuss quantum zero-knowledge
proofs of knowledge and quantum-secure two-party function evaluation.
Both applications assume only fully simulatable coin-flipping and mixed
commitments. Since our framework allows to construct fully simulat-
able coin-flipping from mixed commitments, this in particular shows that
mixed commitments are complete for quantum-secure two-party function
evaluation. This seems to be the first completeness result for quantum-
secure two-party function evaluation from a generic assumption.
1 Introduction
True randomness is a crucial ingredient in many cryptographic applications.
Therefore, secure coin-flipping is an essential primitive, which allows two parties
to agree on a uniformly random bit in a fair way, such that neither party can
influence the value of the coin to his advantage. We investigate coin-flip proto-
cols with classical messages exchange but where the adversary is assumed to be
capable of quantum computing. Security of cryptographic protocols in the quan-
tum world means, of course, that quantum computation does not jeopardize the
assumption, underlying the protocol construction. However, we encounter addi-
tional setbacks in the security proofs, which are mostly due to the fact that some
well-known classical proof techniques cannot be applied in a quantum environ-
ment.
Our Contribution. We aim at establishing coin-flipping as a stand-alone tool
in a model without any setup assumptions. As such, our protocol can be used in
several contexts and different generic constructions. One notable application is
as subroutine for realizing the theoretical assumption of the common-random-
string-model (CRS-model).1 Since the generation of a CRS often significantly
1 In the CRS-model the parties are provided with a public common random string
CRS before communication, taken from the uniform distribution.
simplifies the design of (quantum-secure) protocols, this then implies that var-
ious interesting applications can be implemented quantum-securely in a simple
manner from scratch.
In more detail, we first investigate different degrees of security that a coin-
flip protocol can acquire. Then, we propose and prove constructions that allow
us to amplify the respective degrees of security such that weaker coins are con-
verted into very strong ones.2 The amplification only requires mixed commit-
ment schemes, which we know how to construct with quantum security under
reasonable assumptions—for instance, based on the quantum hardness of the
learning with error problem. Combining our amplification protocols allows to
take a very weak notion of coin-flipping and amplify it to a coin-flip protocol
which is fully simulatable against poly-sized quantum adversaries. By fully simu-
latable we mean that both sides can be simulated in quantum polynomial time.
Our amplification framework should also be understood as a step towards
fully simulatable constant-round coin-flipping. To the best of our knowledge,
to date there does not exist any fully simulatable protocol which is constant-
round and which allows to generate a long random bit-string. In particular, no
fully simulatable constant-round coin-flip protocol is known to securely compose
in parallel. Since all our amplification protocols work in constant-round, we
show that if there exists a constant-round coin-flip protocol of long strings with
weak security, then there also exists a constant-round coin-flip protocol of long
strings which is fully simulatable. Even though our work leaves fully simulatable
constant-round coin-flipping of long strings as a fascinating open problem, we
consider it a contribution in itself to define a reasonably weak but sufficient
security notion to realize fully simulatable constant-round coin-flipping of long
strings.
Related Work. The standard coin-flip protocol of [2] was proven secure in a
quantum environment in previous work [7]. In its basic form this protocol yields
one coin as output. Of greater importance, however, is flipping a string of coins
instead of a bit, in particular, when generating a CRS. The basic construction
composes in sequence with security classified as medium in our framework here.
Parallel composition is possible using an extended construction providing effi-
cient simulations on both sides. This extension, however, requires a CRS as initial
assumption, i.e. the CRS-model, and hence, violates our strong requirement of
applications, implementable quantum-securely without any set-up assumptions.
As an example application, we discussed in [7] the generation of a CRS in
the context of e.g. a quantum zero-knowledge proof. For an overview and more
details, see also [14]. To further show the implications of coin-flipping as an im-
plementation of the CRS-model in the quantum setting, we here add the func-
tionalities of a quantum zero-knowledge proof of knowledge and quantum-secure
function evaluation. We want to mention the following related work. First, an
alternative approach in the context of zero-knowledge was independently inves-
2 For clarity, we note that we use the intuitive interpretation of “weak” and “strong”
coins related to their security degrees, which differs from the definitions in the quan-
tum literature.
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tigated by Smith [17]. There, coin-flipping is implemented by a string commit-
ment with special openings and validated in subsequent zero-knowledge proofs
in sequence, and which therefore has round complexity depending on the secu-
rity parameter, i.e. how many proofs must be completed to achieve a negligible
soundness error. The coin-string is used as key to encode the witness and more
zero-knowledge proofs are given to prove that. As encryption scheme, they sug-
gest a scheme with similar properties as in the standard construction for mixed
commitments [4, 5, 8]. To the best of our knowledge, the question of its actual
secure implementation was left open, and a formal description and analysis was
never published. Second, we want to mention the concurrent and independent
work of Hallgren, Smith, and Song, as sketched in [12]. They also prove, among
other things, classical protocols for zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge and func-
tion evaluation secure in the quantum setting by proposing a composition theo-
rem that allows to use the basic coin-flipping protocol in [7] to generate a CRS.
In addition, they give a UC-secure protocol for said tasks in the CRS-model.
Furthermore, the techniques used in our reductions are inspired by techniques
used by works in the UC framework (cf. [8]), where rewinding is also a problem.
But to the best of our knowledge, all our reductions are novel, and might be also
of classical interest.
Security in the Quantum World. It is well known that bit commitments
imply a single coin-flip—in the classical as in the quantum world [2, 7]—in a
straightforward way: Alice chooses a random bit a and commits to it, Bob then
sends his bit b in plain, then the commitment is opened, and the resulting coin
is a ⊕ b. However, even when basing the embedded commitment scheme on
a computational assumption that withstands quantum attacks (for the hiding
property), the security proof of the outer coin-flipping (and its integration into
other applications) cannot easily be translated from the classical to the quantum
world. Typically, security against a classical adversary is argued in this context
by rewinding the adversary in a simulation. In brief, it is shown that a run of a
protocol between a dishonest Bob and honest Alice can be efficiently simulated
without interacting with Alice but with a simulator instead. A simulator basically
prepares a valid conversation and tries it on dishonest Bob. Now, in case Bob
does not send the expected reply, we need the possibility to rewind him. Then
to conclude the proof, we have to show that the expected running time of the
simulation is polynomial.
Unfortunately, rewinding as a proof technique can generally not be directly
applied in the quantum world, i.e., if the dishonest machine is a quantum com-
puter. First, we cannot trivially copy and store an intermediate state of a quan-
tum system, and second, quantum measurements are in general irreversible. In
order to produce a classical transcript, the simulator would have to partially
measure the quantum system without copying it beforehand, but then it would
become impossible to reconstruct all information necessary for correct rewind-
ing [11]. It is worth mentioning though that rewinding in the quantum world
is possible in a limited setting, as shown by Watrous [18]. This technique was
also used for proving the quantum security of single coin-flipping based on bit
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commitments [7]. However, the generation of a string of coin must be based on
string commitments. In this setting, the simulator cannot rewind in poly-time. A
possible solutions for simulating against a classical Bob is then to let him commit
to his message in a way which allows to extract the message in the simulation.
Therewith, the message is known to the simulator in any following iteration of
rewinding. This technique seems to be doomed to fail in the quantum realm, since
it is neither known how to rewind quantumly for string commitments nor can
any intermediate status (such as Bob’s commitment) be preserved. Moreover,
commitment constructions providing flavors of extractability without rewinding
require some stronger set-up assumptions. Thus, other techniques such as our
method based on mixed commitments, are needed for solutions in this context.
Applications. Even though we establish coin-flipping as a stand-alone tool, we
highlight again that the generation of a CRS leads to a simple and quantum-
secure implementation of various interesting applications without any set-up
assumptions. We show two different example applications, in addition to the
functionalities already discussed in [7]. First, we propose a quantum-secure zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge based on a witness encoding scheme, which we
define such that it provides a certain degree of extractability and simulatabil-
ity in the quantum world. Our zero-knowledge construction only requires mixed
commitments, which can be implemented with quantum security. This is of par-
ticular interest, as the problems of rewinding in the quantum realm complicate
implementing proofs of knowledge from scratch. And second, we show that mixed
commitment schemes are sufficient for quantum-secure function evaluation of any
classical poly-time function f with security against active quantum adversaries.
In more detail, we first show that mixed commitments imply an oblivious trans-
fer protocol with passive security. From that it is straightforward to construct a
protocol for any classical poly-time function with security against passive quan-
tum adversaries [13]. As our main result in that context, we then propose a
quantum-secure implementation for evaluating any such function with security
against active quantum adversaries.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. We use negl (n) to denote the set of negligible functions (in n).
For a bit-string x ∈ {0, 1}n and a subset S ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of size s, we define
x|S ∈ {0, 1}s to be the restriction (xi)i∈S . The probability of event E is denoted
by Pr [E]. For a random variable X we use PX to denote the distribution of
X , and for an additional random variable Y we use PX|Y to denote the con-
ditional distribution of X given Y . Statistical indistinguishability of families of
classical random variables is denoted by
s
≈, and
q
≈ indicates quantum poly-time
indistinguishability of families of random variables, i.e., the families cannot be
distinguished by poly-sized families of quantum circuits.
Definition of Security. We are interested in classical two-party protocols se-
cure in a quantum world. We work in the security framework, introduced in [9]
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and extended in [4]. The definitions are proposed for quantum protocols that
implement classical non-reactive two-party functionalities, meaning that in- and
output must be classical. The framework allows functionalities which behave dif-
ferently in case of a dishonest player, and it is further shown that any protocol
in the framework composes sequentially in a classical environment, i.e. within an
outer classical protocol. For the sake of simplicity, the framework does not assume
additional entities such as e.g. an environment. The original security definitions
for unconditional security [9] are phrased in simple information-theoretic con-
ditions, depending on the functionality, which implies strong simulation-based
security. In [4], it is then shown that computational security (in the CRS-model)
can be defined similarly. In the following, we state the formalism essential for
this work.3 For more details on the framework and notation, we refer to [4,6,9],
and to [14] for an overview.
Our protocols run between players Alice (A) and Bob (B) and all definitions
are given in the two-world paradigm of simulation-based proofs. The real world
captures the actual protocol Π , consisting of message exchange between the
parties and local computations. Real-world players are denoted by honest A,B
and are restricted to poly-time classical strategies. Dishonest players A′,B′ are
allowed any quantum poly-time strategy. Formally, let P denote the set of poly-
size quantum circuits, so we assume that A′,B′ ∈ P. The ideal functionality F
models the intended behavior of the protocol in the ideal world, where the players
interact using F . Honest and dishonest players in the ideal world (a.k.a. sim-
ulators) are denoted by Aˆ, Bˆ and Aˆ′, Bˆ′, respectively. An honest player simply
forwards messages to and from F , dishonest players are allowed to change their
messages. Again Aˆ′, Bˆ′ ∈ P. Now, the input-output behavior of F defines the
required input-output behavior of Π . Intuitively, if the executions are indistin-
guishable, security of the protocol in real life follows. In other words, a dishonest
real-world player that attacks protocol Π cannot achieve (significantly) more
than an ideal-world adversary that attacks the corresponding functionality F .
The common input state ρUV =
∑
u,v PUV (u, v)|u〉〈u| ⊗ |v〉〈v| for some prob-
ability distribution PUV is classical, and we understand U, V as random input
variables (for Alice and Bob, respectively). The same holds for the classical
output state ρXY with output X,Y for Alice respectively Bob. The input-
output behavior of the protocol is uniquely determined by PXY |UV , and we
write Π(U, V ) = (X,Y ). Then, a general classical ideal functionality F is given
by a conditional probability distribution PF(U,V )|UV with F(U, V ) denoting the
ideal-world execution, where the players forward their inputs U, V to F and
output whatever they obtain from F .
Definition 1 (Correctness). A protocol Π(U, V ) = (X,Y ) correctly imple-
ments an ideal classical functionality F , if for every distribution of the input
values U and V , the resulting common output (X,Y ) satisfies (U, V,X, Y )
s
≈
(U, V,F(U, V )).
3 Note that we use a simplified joint output representation in comparison to [9].
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We now define computational security against dishonest Alice, the definitions
for dishonest Bob are analogue. Let Z and U ′ denote dishonest Alice’s classical
and quantum information. We consider a poly-size quantum circuit, called input
sampler, which takes as input the security parameter and produces the input
state ρU ′ZV . We require from the input sampler that any ρU ′ZV is restricted to
be of form ρU ′↔Z↔V =
∑
z,v PZV (z, v)|z〉〈z| ⊗ |v〉〈v| ⊗ ρ
z
U ′ (see [6] for notational
details), where it holds that4 ρzU ′ = ρ
z,v
U ′ . This expresses conditional indepen-
dence, namely that Bob’s classical V is independent of Alice’s quantum part U ′
when given Z. In other words, Alice’s quantum part U ′ is correlated with Bob’s
part only via her classical Z.
Definition 2 (Computational security against dishonest Alice). A pro-
tocol Π implements an ideal classical functionality F computationally securely
against dishonest Alice, if for any real-world adversary A′ ∈ P, there exists an
ideal-world adversary Aˆ′ ∈ P such that, for any efficient input sampler with
ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V , it holds that the outputs are quantum-computationally in-
distinguishable, i.e., outΠ
A′,B
q
≈ outF
Aˆ′,Bˆ
.
We state these output states explicitly as outΠ
A′,B = ρUX′ZY and out
F
Aˆ′,Bˆ
=
ρUX′↔Z↔Y , which shows that Alice’s possibilities in the ideal world are limited:
She can produce some classical input U for F from her quantum input state
U ′, and then she can obtain a quantum state X ′ by locally processing U and
possibly F ’s classical reply X .
3 Security Notions for Coin-Flipping
We denote a generic protocol with a λ-bit coin-string as output by Π λ−COIN
A,B ,
corresponding to an ideal functionality Fλ−COIN. The outcome of such a protocol
is c ∈ {0, 1}λ∪{⊥}, i.e., either an λ-bit-string or an error message. We use several
security parameters, indicating the length of coin-strings for different purposes;
the length of a coin-flip yielding a key or a challenge are denoted by κ or σ,
respectively. The ideal functionality for coin-flipping is defined symmetric such
that always the respective dishonest party has an option to abort. We state the
ideal functionalities in the case of both players being honest and in the case of
dishonest Alice and honest Bob (Fig. 1). Note that the latter then also applies
to honest Alice and dishonest Bob by simply switching sides and names.
Recall that the joint output representation of a protocol execution is denoted
by outΠ
A,B (with Π = Π
λ−COIN
A,B ) and given here for the case of honest players. The
same notation with F = Fλ−COIN and Aˆ, Bˆ applies in the ideal world as outF
Aˆ,Bˆ
,
where the players invoke the ideal functionality Fλ−COIN and output whatever
4 ρxE denotes a state in register E, depending on value x ∈ X of random variable X
over X with distribution PX . Then, from the view of an observer, who holds register
E but does not know X, the system is in state ρE =
∑
x∈X
PX(x)ρ
x
E, where ρE
depends on X in the sense that E is in state ρxE exactly if X = x.
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Functionality Fλ−COIN with honest players:
Upon receiving requests start from both Alice and Bob, Fλ−COIN outputs
uniformly random h ∈R {0, 1}
λ to Alice and Bob.
Functionality Fλ−COIN with dishonest Alice:
1. Upon receiving requests start from both Alice and Bob, Fλ−COIN outputs
uniformly random h ∈R {0, 1}
λ to Alice.
2. It then waits to receive her second input ⊤ or ⊥ and outputs h or ⊥ to Bob,
respectively.
Figure 1. The Ideal Functionality for λ-bit Coin-Flipping.
they obtain from it. We need an additional notation here, describing the outcome
of a protocol run between e.g. honest A and B, namely c← Π λ−COIN
A,B .
We will define three flavors of security for coin-flip protocols, namely un-
controllable (uncont), random and enforceable (force). The two sides can have
different flavors. Then, if a protocol Π λ−COIN
A,B is, for instance, enforceable against
Alice and random against Bob, we write π(force,random), and similarly for the
eight other combinations of security. Note that for simplicity of notation, we will
then omit the indexed name as well as the length of the coin, as they are clear
from the context. Again, we define all three flavors for Alice’s side only, as the
definitions for Bob are analogue. Recall that U ′ and Z resp. V denote dishon-
est Alice’s quantum and classical input resp. honest Bob’s classical input. As
before, we assume a poly-size input sampler, which takes as input the security
parameter, and produces a valid input state ρU ′ZV = ρU ′↔Z↔V . Note that an
honest player’s input is empty but models the invocation start. We stress that
we require for all three security flavors and for all c ∈ {0, 1}λ that
Pr [c← Π λ−COIN
A,B ] = 2
−λ ,
which implies that when both parties are honest, then the coin is unbiased.
Below we only define the extra properties required for each of the three flavors.
We call a coin-flip uncontrollable against Alice, if she cannot force the coin
to hit some negligible subset, except with negligible probability.
Definition 3 (Uncontrollability against dishonest Alice). We say that
protocol Π λ−COIN
A,B implements an uncontrollable coin-flip against dishonest Alice,
if it holds for any poly-sized adversary A′ ∈ P with inputs as specified above and
all negligible subsets Q ⊂ {0, 1}λ that
Pr [c← Π λ−COIN
A′,B : c ∈ Q] ∈ negl (κ) .
Note that we denote by Q ⊂ {0, 1}λ a family of subsets {Q(κ) ⊂ {0, 1}λ(κ)}κ∈N
for security parameter κ. Then we call Q negligible, if |Q(κ)|2−λ(κ) is negligible
in κ. In other words, we call a subset negligible, if it contains a negligible fraction
of the elements in the set in which it lives.
7
We call a coin-flip random against Alice, if she cannot enforce a non-uniformly
random output string in {0, 1}λ, except by making the protocol fail on some
chosen runs. That means she can at most lower the probability of certain output
strings compared to the uniform case.
Definition 4 (Randomness against dishonest Alice).We say that protocol
Π λ−COIN
A,B implements a random coin-flip against dishonest Alice, if it holds for
any poly-sized adversary A′ ∈ P with inputs as specified above that there exists
an event E such that Pr [E] ∈ negl (κ) and for all x ∈ {0, 1}λ it holds that
Pr [c← Π λ−COIN
A′,B : c = x | E¯] ≤ 2
−λ .
It is obvious that if a coin-flip is random against Alice, then it is also an un-
controllable coin-flip against her. We will later discuss a generic transformation
going in the other direction from uncontrollable to random coin-flipping.
We call a coin-flip enforceable against Alice, if it is possible, given a uniformly
random c, to simulate a run of the protocol hitting exactly the outcome c, though
we still allow that the corrupted party forces abort on some outcomes.5
Definition 5 (Enforceability against dishonest Alice). We call protocol
Π λ−COIN
A,B enforceable against dishonest Alice, if it implements the ideal function-
ality Fλ−COIN against her.
That means that for any poly-sized adversary A′ ∈ P, there exists an ideal-world
adversary Aˆ′ ∈ P that simulates the protocol with A′ as follows. Aˆ′ requests
output h ∈ {0, 1}λ from Fλ−COIN. Then it simulates a run of the coin-flip protocol
with A′ and tries to enforce output h. If Aˆ′ succeeds, it inputs ⊤ as A′’s second
input to Fλ−COIN. In that case, Fλ−COIN outputs h. Otherwise, Aˆ′ inputs ⊥ to
Fλ−COIN as second input and Fλ−COIN outputs ⊥. In addition, the simulation is
such that the ideal output is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from
the output of an actual run of the protocol, i.e., outΠ
A′,B
q
≈ outF
Aˆ′,Bˆ
, where Π =
Π λ−COIN
A′,B and F = Fλ−COIN. Enforceability against dishonest Bob is analogously
defined. Corollary 1 follows.
Corollary 1. If Π λ−COIN
A,B ∈ π
(force,force), i.e., it is enforceable against both dis-
honest Alice and dishonest Bob, then Π λ−COIN
A,B is a secure implementation of
Fλ−COIN, according to Definition 2.
4 Mixed Commitments
We use mixed commitment schemes throughout our constructions—they will
indeed be our only computational assumption. Mixed commitment are uncon-
ditionally hiding for some public keys and unconditionally binding for others.
5 Note that an enforceable coin-flip is not necessarily a random coin-flip, as it is
allowed that the outcome of an enforceable coin-flip is only quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from uniformly random, whereas a random coin-flip is required to
produce truly random outcomes on the non-aborting runs.
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In the following, we introduce mixed commitments, denoted by commitpk, more
formally. We also describe a construction of an interactive commitment protocol
COMMITpk with mixed-commitment-scheme-like properties. The reason for pre-
senting the protocol here is to simplify the description of the later protocol in
which it is used as a subprotocol.
4.1 Mixed Commitment Schemes
Mixed commitment schemes consists of four poly-time algorithms GH, GB, commit,
and xtr. The unconditionally hiding key generator GH outputs public keys pk ∈
{0, 1}κ.6 The unconditionally binding key generator GB outputs key pairs (pk, sk),
where pk ∈ {0, 1}κ and where sk is the secret key. The commitment algorithm
takes as input a message m, a randomizer r and a public key pk and outputs a
commitment C = commit pk (m, r) . The extraction algorithm xtr takes as input
a commitment C and a secret key sk and outputs a message m′, meant to be
the message committed by C. We require the following properties:
Unconditionally hiding: For keys pk generated by GH it holds that commitpk
is statistically hiding, i.e. (pk, commit pk (m1, r1) )
s
≈ (pk, commit pk (m2, r2) ) for
all m1,m2 when r1 and r2 are uniformly random and independent.
Extractability: It holds for all pairs (pk, sk) generated by GB and for all values
m, r that xtrsk(commit pk (m, r) ) = m.
Key indistinguishability: A random public key pk1 generated by GB and a
random public key pk2 generated by GH are indistinguishable by poly-sized quan-
tum circuits, i.e., pk1
q
≈ pk2.
We additionally require that random public keys generated by GH are sta-
tistically close to uniform in {0, 1}κ, i.e., almost all keys are unconditionally
hiding.7
As a candidate for instantiating our definition we can, for instance, take the
lattice-based public-key encryption scheme of Regev [16] in its multi-bit vari-
ant as given in the full version of [15]. Regev’s cryptosystem is based on the
hardness of the learning with error problem, which can be reduced from worst-
case (quantum) hardness of the shortest vector problem (in its decision version).
Thus, breaking the scheme implies an efficient algorithm for approximating the
lattice problem in the worst-case, which is assumed to be hard even with quan-
tum computing power. A regular public key for Regev’s scheme is proven to be
quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the case where a public key is
chosen from the uniform distribution. In this case, the ciphertext carries essen-
tially no information about the message [16, Lemma 5.4]. This proof of semantic
6 For notational simplicity, the length of public keys is assumed to equal security
parameter κ.
7 The definition is a weakening of the original notion of mixed commitments from [8],
in that we do not require that unconditionally hiding keys are equipped with an
equivocation trapdoor. It is also a strengthening in that we require quantum indis-
tinguishability of the two key flavors.
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security for Regev’s cryptosystem is in fact the property we require for our com-
mitment.
4.2 The protocol COMMITpk
In one of our security amplifications of coin-flip protocols we will need a mixed
commitment scheme which also provides equivocability, i.e., a simulator can open
unconditionally hiding commitments to different values. We add equivocability
using an interactive protocol COMMITpk. Instead of equipping unconditionally hid-
ing keys with equivocation trapdoors, we will do it by letting the equivocation
trapdoor be the ability of the simulator to force the outcome of a coin-flip proto-
col in the simulation. The reason for this change, as compared to [8], is that the
notion of a mixed commitment scheme in [8] was developed for the CRS-model,
where the simulator is free to pick the CRS and hence could pick it to be a un-
conditionally hiding public key with known equivocation trapdoor. Here we are
interested in the bare (CRS devoid) model and hence have to add equivocation
in a different manner. This is one of the essential steps in bootstrapping fully
simulatable strong coin-flipping from weak coin-flipping.
The protocol COMMITpk uses a secret sharing scheme sss, described now. Let
σ be a secondary security parameter. Given message m = (m1, . . . ,mσ) ∈ Fσ
and randomizer s = (s1, . . . , sσ) ∈ Fσ, let fm,s(X) denote the unique polynomial
of degree 2σ − 1, for which fm,s(−i + 1) = mi for i = 1, . . . , σ and fm,s(i) = si
for i = 1, . . . , σ. Furthermore, we “fill up” positions i = σ + 1, . . . , Σ, where
Σ = 4σ, by letting si = fm,s(i). The shares are now s = (s1, . . . , sΣ).
We stress two simple facts about sss. First, for any message m ∈ Fσ and
any subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , Σ} of size |S| = σ, the shares s|S are uniformly random
in Fσ, when S is chosen uniformly at random in Fσ and independent of m. This
aspect is trivial for S = {1, . . . , σ}, as we defined it that way, and it extends
to the other subsets using Lagrange interpolation. And second, if m1,m2 ∈ Fσ
are two distinct messages, then sss(m1; s1) and sss(m2; s2) have Hamming
distance at least Σ−2σ. Again, this follows by Lagrange interpolation, since the
polynomial fm1,s1(X) has degree at most 2σ−1, and hence, can be computed from
any 2σ shares si using Lagrange interpolation. The same holds for fm2,s2(X).
Thus, if 2σ shares are the same, then fm1,s1(X) and fm2,s2(X) are the same,
which implies that the messages m1 = fm1,s1(−σ + 1), . . . , fm1,s1(0) and m
2 =
fm2,s2(−σ + 1), . . . , fm2,s2(0) are the same.
In addition to sss, the protocol COMMITpk uses a mixed commitment scheme
commitpk. The key generators for COMMITpk are the same as for commitpk. Fi-
nally, COMMITpk uses a coin-flip protocol π
(random,force) which is random for the
committer and which is enforceable against the receiver of the commitment. The
details of COMMITpk are given in Fig. 2.
We first show that when (pk, sk) is generated using GB, then COMMITpk is ex-
tractable. Given any commitment M =
(
M1, . . . ,MΣ
)
, we extract xtrsk(M) =(
xtrsk(M1), . . . , xtrsk(MΣ)
)
= (s1, . . . , sΣ) = s . Assume s
′ = (s′1, . . . , s
′
Σ) is
the consistent sharing closest to s. That means that s′ is the vector which is
consistent with a polynomial fm′,s′(X) of degree at most 2σ − 1 and which at
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Commitment Scheme COMMITpk:
Commitment Phase:
1. Let message m ∈ Fσ be the message. The committer samples uniformly
random s ∈ Fσ and computes the shares sss(m; s) = (s1, . . . , sΣ), where
si ∈ F.
2. He computes COMMIT pk
(
m, (s, r)
)
=
(
M1, . . . ,MΣ
)
, where Mi =
commit pk (si, ri) for randomness r = (r1, . . . , rΣ).
3. The committer sends (M1, . . . ,MΣ).
Opening Phase:
1. The committer sends the shares s = (s1, . . . , sΣ) to the receiver.
2. If the shares are not consistent with a polynomial of degree at most 2σ−1,
the receiver aborts.
3. The parties run pi(random,force) to generate a uniformly random subset S ⊂
{1, . . . , Σ} of size |S| = σ.
4. The committer sends r|S .
5. The receiver verifies that Mi = commit pk (si, ri) for all i ∈ S. If the test
fails, he aborts. Otherwise, he computes the message m ∈ Fσ consistent
with s.
Figure 2. The Commitment Scheme COMMITpk.
the same time differs from s in the fewest positions. Note that we can find s′ in
poly-time when using a Reed Solomon code, which has efficient minimal distance
decoding. We then interpolate the polynomial fm′,s′(X), let m
′ = fm′,s′(−σ +
1), . . . , fm′,s′(0), and let xtrsk(M) = m
′. Any other sharing s′′ = (s′′1 , . . . , s
′′
Σ)
must have Hamming distance at least 2σ to s′. Now, since s is closer to s′ than
to any other consistent sharing, it must, in particular, be closer to s′ then to s′′.
This implies that s is at distance at least σ to s′′.
We will use this observation for proving soundness of the opening phase. To
determine the soundness error, assume that COMMITpk does not open to the shares
s′ consistent with s. As observed, this implies that
(
xtrsk(M1), . . . , xtrsk(MΣ)
)
has Hamming distance at least σ to s′. However, when commitpk is uncondition-
ally binding, allMi can only be opened to xtrsk(Mi). From the above two facts,
we have that there are at least σ values i ∈ {1, . . . , Σ} such that the receiver
cannot open Mi to si for i ∈ S. Since Σ = 4σ, these σ bad indices (bad for a
dishonest sender) account for a fraction of 14 of all points in {1, . . . , Σ}. Thus,
the probability that none of the σ points in S is a bad index is at most (34 )
σ,
which is negligible. Setting σ = log 4
3
2 gives a negligible error of (12 )
κ, where κ
is the security parameter.
We then analyze the equivocability of COMMITpk. We will use the ability of the
simulator for the committer to force the challenge S as the simulator’s trapdoor.
It will simply pick S uniformly at random before the simulation and prepare for
this particular challenge. The details are given in Fig. 3. We omit an analysis
here but refer to Section 5.2, where the construction will be further discussed.
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Simulating COMMITpk with Trapdoor S:
1. Sˆ gets as input a uniformly random subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , Σ} of size σ and an
initial message m ∈ Fσ.
2. Sˆ commits honestly to m ∈ Fσ by M = COMMIT sk
(
m, (s, r)
)
, as specified in
the commitment phase.
3. Sˆ is given an alternative message m˜ ∈ Fσ, i.e., the aim is opening M to m˜.
4. Sˆ lets s|S be the σ messages committed to by M |S . Then it interpolates the
unique polynomial fm˜,s of degree at most 2σ − 1 for which fm˜,s(i) = si for
i ∈ S and for which fm˜,s(−i + 1) = m˜i for i = 1, . . . , σ. Note that this is
possible, as we have exactly 2σ points which restrict our choice of fm˜,s. Sˆ
sends s =
(
fm˜,s(1), . . . , fm˜,s(Σ)
)
to the receiver.
5. The parties run pi(random,force) and Sˆ forces the outcome S.
6. For all i ∈ S, the sender opensMi to fm˜,s(i). This is possible, since fm˜,s(i) = si
is exactly the message committed to by Mi when i ∈ S.
Figure 3. The Ideal-World Simulation of COMMITpk.
5 Amplification Theorems for Strong Coin-Flipping
We now propose and prove theorems, which allow us to amplify the security
strength of coins. Ultimately, we aim at constructing a strong coin-flip protocol
π(force,force) with outcomes of any polynomial length ℓ in λ from a weaker coin-
flip protocol π(force,uncont) of κ-bit-strings, where κ is the key length of the mixed
commitment scheme. We do this in two steps. We first show how to implement
π(force,random) for ℓ-bit-strings (for any polynomial ℓ) given π(force,uncont) for κ-bit-
strings, and we then show how to implement π(force,force) for poly-long bit-strings
given π(force,random) for poly-long bit-strings.
The ability to amplify π(force,uncont) for κ-bit-strings to π(force,force) for poly-
bit-string is of course only interesting, if there exists such a candidate. We do
not know of any protocol with flavor (force, uncont) but not (force, random).
However, we consider it as a contribution in itself to find the weakest security
notion for coin-flipping that allows to amplify to the final strong (force, force)
notion using a constant-round reduction.
A candidate for π(force,random) with one-bit outcomes is the protocol in [7],
which is—in terms of this context—enforceable against one side in poly-time
and random on the other side, with empty event E according to Definition 4,
and the randomness guarantee even withstanding an unbounded adversary.8 The
protocol was shown to be sequentially composable [7,14]. Repeating the protocol
κ times in sequence gives a protocol π(force,random) for κ-bit-strings. Note that
this, in particular, gives a protocol π(force,uncont) for κ-bit-strings.
8 The protocol was described and proven as pi(random,force), but due to the symmetric
coin-flip definitions here, we can easily switch sides between A and B.
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5.1 From (force, uncont) to (force, random)
Assume that we are given a protocol π(force,uncont), that only guarantees that Bob
cannot force the coin to hit a negligible subset (except with negligible probabil-
ity). We now amplify the security on Bob’s side from uncontrollable to random
and therewith obtain a protocol π(force,random), in which Bob cannot enforce a
non-uniformly random output string, except by letting the protocol fail on some
occasions. The stronger protocol π(force,random) is given in Fig. 4, where commitpk
is the basic mixed commitment scheme as described in Section 4.1. Correctness
of π(force,random) is obvious by inspection of the protocol.
Protocol pi(force,random):
1. A and B run pi(force,uncont) to produce a public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. A samples a ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ, commits to it with A = commit pk (a, r) and random-
izer r ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ, and sends A to B.
3. B samples b ∈R {0, 1}
ℓ and sends b to A.
4. A opens A towards B.
5. The outcome is c = a⊕ b.
Figure 4. Amplification from (force, uncont) to (force, random).
Theorem 1. If π(force,uncont) is enforceable against Alice and uncontrollable
against Bob, then protocol π(force,random) is enforceable against Alice and random
for Bob.
We sketch the basic ideas behind the proof, which can be found in greater detail
in Appendix A. Enforceability against A follows by forcing pk to be a pk gener-
ated as (pk, sk)← GB. The simulator then uses sk to extract a from A and then
sends the b which makes a⊕b hit the desired outcome. Randomness against B fol-
lows from the fact that only a negligible fraction of the keys pk ∈ {0, 1}κ are not
unconditionally hiding keys and the outcome of π(force,uncont) is uncontrollable
for B.
5.2 From (force, random) to (force, force)
We now show how to obtain a coin-flip protocol, which is enforceable against
both parties. Then, we can also claim by Corollary 1 that this protocol is a strong
coin-flip protocol, poly-time simulatable on both sides for the natural ideal func-
tionality Fℓ−COIN. The protocol π(force,force) is described in Fig. 5 and uses the
extended commitment construction COMMITpk from Section 4.2. The protocol
makes two calls to a subprotocol with random flavor on one side and enforce-
ability on the other side, but where the sides are interchanged, i.e. π(force,random)
and π(random,force), so we simply switch the players’ roles. Again, correctness of
the protocol can be trivially checked.
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Protocol pi(force,force):
1. A and B run pi(force,random) to produce a random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. A computes and sends commitments COMMIT pk
(
a, (s, r)
)
= (A1, . . . , AΣ) to
B. In more detail, A samples uniformly random a, s ∈ Fσ. She then computes
sss(a; s) = (a1, . . . , aΣ) and Ai = commit pk (ai, ri) for i = 1, . . . , Σ.
3. B samples uniformly random b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and sends b to A.
4. A sends secret shares (a1, . . . , aΣ) to B. If (a1, . . . , aΣ) is not consistent with
a polynomial of degree at most (2σ − 1), B aborts.
5. A and B run pi(random,force) to produce a challenge S ⊂ {1, . . . , Σ} of length
|S| = σ.
6. A sends r|S to B.
7. B checks if Ai = commit pk (ai, ri) for all i ∈ S. If that is the case, B computes
message a ∈ Fσ consistent with (a1, . . . , aΣ) and the outcome of the protocol
is c = a⊕ b. Otherwise, B aborts and the outcome is c = ⊥ .
Figure 5. Amplification from (force, random) to (force, force).
Theorem 2. If π(force,random) is enforceable against Alice and random against
Bob, then protocol π(force,force) is enforceable against both Alice and Bob.
We sketch the main ideas behind the proof, which can be found in greater de-
tail in Appendix B. Enforceability against A follows by forcing pk to be a key
pk generated as (pk, sk) ← GB. The simulator then uses sk to extract a from
(A1, . . . , AΣ). Then it sends the b that makes a ⊕ b hit the desired outcome.
Enforceability against B follows by letting the simulator sample a uniformly
random S and running COMMIT pk
(
a, (s, r)
)
= (A1, . . . , AΣ) in the equivocal
model with trapdoor S. Then the simulator waits for b and forces the outcome
of π(random,force) to be S, which allows it to open (A1, . . . , AΣ) to the a that
makes a⊕ b hit the desired outcome.
6 Application: Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge
The purpose of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge [1,10] is to verify in classical
poly-time in the length of the instance, whether the prover’s private input w is a
valid witness for the common instance x in relation R, i.e. (x,w) ∈ R. Here, we
propose a quantum-secure construction of a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge
based on witness encoding, which we define in the context of a simulation in
the quantum world. The protocol is constant-round if the coin-flip protocol is
constant-round.
6.1 Simulatable Witness Encodings of NP
We first specify a simulatable encoding scheme for binary relation R ⊂ {0, 1}∗×
{0, 1}∗, which consists of five classical poly-time algorithms (E,D, S, J, Eˆ). Then,
we define completeness, extractability and simulatability for such a scheme in
terms of the requirements of our zero-knowledge proof of knowledge.
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Let E : R × {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n denote an encoder, such that for each
(x,w) ∈ R, the n-bit output e ← E(x,w, r′) is a random encoding of w, with
randomness r′ ∈ {0, 1}m and polynomials m(|x|) and n(|x|). The corresponding
decoder D : {0, 1}∗×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}∗ takes as input an instance x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and
an encoding e ∈ {0, 1}n and outputs w ← D(x, e) with w ∈ {0, 1}∗. Next, let S
denote a selector with input s ∈ {0, 1}σ (with polynomial σ(|x|)) specifying a
challenge, and output S(s) defining a poly-sized subset of {1, . . . , n} correspond-
ing to challenge s. We will use S(s) to select which bits of an encoding e to reveal
to the verifier. For simplicity, we use es to denote the collection of bits e|S(s). We
denote with J the judgment that checks a potential encoding e by inspecting
only bits es. In more detail, J takes as input instance x ∈ {0, 1}
∗, challenge
s ∈ {0, 1}σ and the |S(s)| bits es, and outputs a judgment j ← J(x, s, es) with
j ∈ {abort, success}. Finally, the simulator is called Eˆ. It takes as input in-
stance x ∈ {0, 1}∗ and challenge s ∈ {0, 1}σ and outputs a random collection of
bits t|S(s) ← Eˆ(x, s). Again for simplicity, we let ts = t|S(s). Then, if this set has
the same distribution as bits of an encoding e in positions S(s), the bits needed
for the judgment to check an encoding e can be simulated given just instance x
(see Definition 8).
Definition 6 (Completeness). If an encoding e ← E(x,w, r) is generated
correctly, then success← J(x, s, es) for all s ∈ {0, 1}σ.
We will call an encoding e admissible for x, if there exist two distinct chal-
lenges s, s′ ∈ {0, 1}σ for which success← J(x, s, es) and success← J(x, s′, es′).
Definition 7 (Extractability). If an encoding e is admissible for x, then(
x,D(x, e)
)
∈ R.
We stress that extractability is similarly defined to the special soundness prop-
erty of a classical Σ-protocol, which allows to extract w from two accepting
conversations with distinct challenges. Such a requirement would generally be
inapplicable in the quantum setting, as the usual rewinding technique is prob-
lematic and in particular in the context here, we cannot measure two accepting
conversations during rewinding in the quantum world. Therefore, we define the
stronger requirement that if there exist two distinct answerable challenges for
one encoding e, then w can be extracted given only e. This condition works
nicely in the quantum world, since we can obtain e without rewinding, as we
demonstrate below.
Definition 8 (Simulatability). For all (x,w) ∈ R and all s ∈R {0, 1}σ, the
distribution of e ← E(x,w, r′) restricted to positions S(s) is identical to the
distribution of ts ← Eˆ(x, s).
To construct a simulatable witness encoding one can, for instance, start from
the commit-and-open protocol for circuit satisfiability in [3], where the bits of
the randomized circuit committed to by the sender is easy to see as a simulatable
encoding of a witness being a consistent evaluation of the circuit to output 1. The
challenge in the protocol is one bit e and the prover replies by showing either the
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bits corresponding to some positions S′(0) or positions S′(1). The details can be
found in [3]. This gives us a simulatable witness encoding for any NP-relation
R with σ = 1, using a Karp reduction from NP to circuit simulatability. By
repeating it σ times in parallel we get a simulatable witness encoding for any σ.
For i = 1, . . . , σ, compute an encoding ei of w and let e = (e1, . . . , eσ). Then for
s ∈ {0, 1}σ, let S(s) specify that the bits S′(si) should be shown in ei and check
these bits. Note, in particular, that if two distinct s and s′ passes this judgment,
then there exists i such that si 6= s′i, so e
i passes the judgment for both si = 0
and si = 1, which by the properties of the protocol for circuit satisfiability allows
to compute a witness w for x from ei. One can find w from e simply by trying
to decode each ej for j = 1, . . . , σ and check if (x,wj) ∈ R.
6.2 The Protocol
We now construct a quantum-secure zero-knowledge proof of knowledge from
prover A to verifier B. We are interested in the NP-language
L(R) = {x ∈ {0, 1}∗ | ∃w s.t. (x,w) ∈ R}, where A has input x and w, and
both A and B receive positive or negative judgment of the validity of the proof
as output. We assume in the following that on input (x,w) /∈ R, honest A
aborts. Unlike zero-knowledge proofs, proofs of knowledge can be modeled by
an ideal functionality, given as FZKPK(R) in Fig. 6. FZKPK(R) can be thought of as
a channel which only allows to send messages in the language L(R). It models
zero-knowledge, as it only leaks instance x and judgment j but not witness w.
Furthermore, it models a proof of knowledge, since Alice has to know and input
a valid witness w to obtain output j = success.
Functionality FZKPK(R):
1. On input (x,w) from Alice, FZKPK(R) sets j = success if (x,w) ∈ R. Otherwise,
it sets j = abort.
2. FZKPK(R) outputs (x, j) to Bob.
Figure 6. The Ideal Functionality for a Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge.
Protocol ZKPK(R) is describe in Fig. 7. It is based on our fully simulatable
coin-flip protocol π(force,force), which we analyze here in the hybrid model by
invoking the ideal functionality of sequential coin-flipping twice (but with dif-
ferent output lengths).9 One call to the ideal functionality Fκ−COIN with output
length κ is required to instantiate a mixed bit commitment scheme COMMITpk.
The second call to the functionality Fσ−COIN produces σ-bit challenges for a
simulatable witness encoding scheme with (E,D, S, J, Eˆ) as specified in the pre-
9 Note that in the hybrid model, a simulator can enforce a particular outcome to
hit also when invoking the ideal coin-flip functionality. We then use Definition 5 to
replace the ideal functionality by the actual protocol pi(force,force).
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vious Section 6.1. The formal proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Appendix C.
Corollary 2 follows immediately.
Theorem 3. For any simulatable witness encoding scheme (E,D, S, J, Eˆ), sat-
isfying completeness, extractability, and simulatability according to Definitions 6
- 8, and for negligible knowledge error 2−σ, protocol ZKPK(R) securely implements
FZKPK(R).
Corollary 2. If there exist mixed commitment schemes, then we can construct
a classical zero-knowledge proof of knowledge against any quantum adversary
P
′ ∈ P without any set-up assumptions.
Protocol ZKPK(R) :
1. A and B invoke Fκ−COIN to get a commitment key pk ∈ {0, 1}
κ.
2. A samples e ← E(x,w, r′) with randomness r′ ∈ {0, 1}m and commits
position-wise to all ei for i = 1, . . . , n, by computing Ei = commit pk (ei, ri)
with randomness r ∈ {0, 1}n. She sends x and all Ei to B.
3. A and B invoke Fσ−COIN to flip a challenge s ∈R {0, 1}
σ.
4. A opens her commitments to all es.
5. If any opening is incorrect, B outputs abort. Otherwise, he outputs j ←
J(x, s, es).
Figure 7. Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge.
7 Application: Two-Party Function Evaluation
Here, we first show that mixed commitments imply a passively secure oblivi-
ous transfer protocol. From such a protocol it is straightforward to construct a
protocol for any classical poly-time function with security against passive quan-
tum adversaries [13]. We then propose a quantum-secure implementation for
evaluating any such function with security against active quantum adversaries.
7.1 Oblivious Transfer
In an oblivious transfer protocol (OT), the sender A sends two messages m0 and
m1 to the selector B. B can choose which message to receive, i.e. mc according
to his choice bit c. B does not learn anything about the other message m1−c,
and A does not learn B’s choice bit c (see Fig. 8). The protocol is correct, as
B knows skc and xtrskc(Cc) = xtrskc(commit pkc (mc, rc) ) = mc. Furthermore,
it hides the other message m1−c as commitpk1−c is unconditionally hiding for
random pk1−c, except with negligible probability. Last, the choice bit is hidden
in the sense of quantum-computational indistinguishability between keys for the
outer commitments, namely a key produced by GB and a random key by GH.
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Protocol OT :
1. B samples two keys pk0 and pk1 according to his choice bit c, i.e. he samples
pkc as (pkc, skc)← GB and pk1−c as p1−c ← GH. He sends (pk0, pk1) to A.
2. A commits to her messages (m0,m1) by computing C0 = commit pk0 (m0, r0)
and C1 = commit pk1 (m1, r1) . She sends (C0, C1) to B.
3. B computes xtrskc(Cc).
Figure 8. Oblivious Transfer based on Mixed Commitments.
7.2 The Protocol
Based on protocol OT, we can construct a passively secure protocol for any classi-
cal poly-time function f . Let Πf
A,B(x1, r1, x2, r2) denote such a protocol between
parties A and B with inputs x1 and x2 and random strings r1 and r2, respectively.
We show an implementation of the ideal functionality FfSFE evaluating—with se-
curity against active quantum adversaries—any classical poly-time function f
for which there exists a classical passively secure protocol as described above.
Functionality FfSFE is shown in Fig. 9.
10 The implementation Π
SFE(f)
A,B of F
f
SFE is
shown in Fig. 10. Corollary 3 is proven in Appendix D.
Corollary 3. If there exist mixed commitment schemes, then there exists a clas-
sical implementation of FfSFE for all classical poly-time functions f secure, ac-
cording to Definitions 1 and 2.
Functionality FfSFE with honest players:
On input x1 from Alice and x2 from Bob, F
f
SFE outputs y = f(x1, x2) to Alice and
Bob.
Functionality FfSFE with dishonest Alice:
1. On input x1 from Alice and x2 from Bob, F
f
SFE outputs y = f(x1, x2) to Alice.
2. It then waits to receive her second input ⊤ or ⊥ and outputs y or ⊥ to Bob,
respectively.
Figure 9. The Ideal Functionality for Secure Function Evaluation.
10 Note that y does not need to be kept secure against external observers and also
allows the adversary to abort depending on the value of y. We stress that it is no
restriction that we consider common outputs nor that we leak y to observers. If we
want to compute function g(x1, x2) = (y1, y2) where only A (B) learns y1 (y2), we
evaluate the common output function y = f((x1, p1), (x2, p2)) as follows. Public y
contains y1 ⊕ p1 and y2 ⊕ p2, where p1 and p2 are A’s and B’s uniformly random
additional input of the same length as y1 and y2. Thus, the common outputs are
one-time pad encrypted using pads known only to the party who is to learn the
result.
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Protocol Π
SFE(f)
A,B :
1. A and B invoke Fκ−COIN to get a commitment key pk ∈ {0, 1}
κ.
2. A sends a random commitment X1 = commit pk (x1, r˜1) and B sends a ran-
dom commitment X2 = commit pk (x2, r˜2) . Both parties use FZKPK(R) to give
a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge that they know the plaintext xi inside
commitments Xi for i = 1, 2.
3. A sends random commitment S1 = commit pk (s1, rˆ1) for uniformly random s1
of length |s1| = |r1|, where r1 is the randomness she intends to use in Π
f
A,B.
Similarly, B sends random commitment S2 = commit pk (s2, rˆ2) for uniformly
random s2 of length |s2| = |r2|. Again, they use FZKPK(R) to give a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge of si in Si for i = 1, 2.
4. A and B invoke Fσ−COIN twice to get uniformly random s
′
1 and s
′
2 with |s
′
i| = |si|
for i = 1, 2.
5. A lets r1 = s1 ⊕ s
′
1 and B lets r2 = s2 ⊕ s
′
2.
6. A and B run Πf
A,B(x1, r1, x2, r2), i.e. they run the passively secure protocol on
inputs and randomness as defined in the previous steps.
7. Whenever A sends a message m in the execution of Πf
A,B(x1, r1, x2, r2), she
gives a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of s1 in S1 and x1 in X1, such that
if Πf
A,B(x1, r1, x2, r2) is run on x1, r1 = s1 ⊕ s
′
1, and B’s messages sent to A
so far, then A would indeed send m. This is an NP-statement, so we can use
FZKPK(R) for this proof.
8. If Πf
A,B(x1, r1, x2, r2) terminates with output y, both parties output y.
Figure 10. Procedure for Secure Function Evaluation
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A Proof of Theorem 1 (Enforceability and Randomness)
Proof (Enforceability against Alice). In case of corrupted A′, Aˆ′ samples
(pk, sk)← GB as input. It then requests a uniformly random value h fromFℓ−COIN.
It runs π(force,uncont) with A′, in which Aˆ′ enforces the outcome pk in the first
step. When A′ sends commitment A, Aˆ′ uses sk to decrypt A to learn the unique
string a that A can be opened to. Aˆ′ computes b = h⊕ a and sends b to A′. If A′
opens commitment A correctly, then the result is c = a⊕ b = a⊕ (h⊕ a) = h as
desired. In case she does not open correctly, Aˆ′ aborts with result ⊥. Otherwise,
Aˆ
′ outputs whatever A′ outputs.
Since h is uniformly random and independent of A and a, it follows that
b = h⊕ a is uniformly random and independent of A, exactly as in the protocol.
Therefore, the transcript of the simulation has the same distribution as the real
protocol, except that pk is uniform in X and not in {0, 1}κ. This is, however,
quantum-computationally indistinguishable, as otherwise, A′ could distinguish
random access to samples from X from random access to samples from {0, 1}κ.
The formal proof proceeds through a series of hybrids as described in full detail
in the proof for Theorem 2 in Appendix B.
The above two facts, that first we hit h when we do not abort, and sec-
ond that the transcript of the simulation is quantum-computationally indistin-
guishable from the real protocol, show that the resulting protocol is enforceable
against Alice and simulatable on Alice’s side for functionality Fℓ−COIN, according
to Definition 5 combined with Theorem 5. 
Proof (Randomness against Bob). For any B′, pk is uncontrollable, i.e. pk ∈
{0, 1}κ \X , except with negligible probability, as X is negligible in {0, 1}κ. This,
in particular, means that the commitment A is perfectly hiding the value a.
Therefore, a is uniformly random and independent of b, and thus, h = a ⊕ b
is uniformly random. This proves that the resulting coin-flip is random against
Bob, according to Definition 4. 
B Proof of Theorem 2 (Enforceability)
Proof (Enforceability against Alice). If A′ is corrupted, Aˆ′ samples (pk, sk)←
GB as input and enforces π(force,random) in the first step to hit the outcome pk. It
then requests value h from Fℓ−COIN. When A′ sends commitments (A1, . . . , AΣ),
Aˆ
′ uses sk to extract a′ with
(
a′1, . . . , a
′
Σ
)
=
(
xtrsk(A1), . . . , xtrsk(AΣ)
)
. Aˆ′
then sets b = h ⊕ a′, and sends b to A′. Then Aˆ′ finishes the protocol honestly.
In the following, we will prove that the transcript is quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from the real protocol and that if c 6= ⊥, then c = h, except
with negligible probability.
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First, we show indistinguishability. The proof proceeds via a hybrid argu-
ment.11 Let D 0 denote the distribution of the output of the simulation as de-
scribed. We now change the simulation such that, instead of sending b = h⊕ a′,
we simply choose a uniformly random b ∈ {0, 1}ℓ and then output the cor-
responding h = a′ ⊕ b. Let D 1 denote the distribution of the output of the
simulation after this change. Since h is uniformly random and independent of a′
in the first case, it follows that then b = h⊕ a′ is uniformly random. Therefore,
the change to choose a uniformly random b in the second case actually does not
change the distribution at all, and it follows that D 0 = D 1.
By sending a uniformly random b, we are in a situation where we do not need
the decryption key sk to produce D 1, as we no longer need to know a′. So we can
now make the further change that, instead of forcing π(force,random) to produce a
random public key pk ∈ X , we force it to hit a random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
This produces a distribution D 2 of the output of the simulation. Since D 1 and
D 2 only differ in the key we enforce π(force,random) to hit and the simulation is
quantum poly-time, there exists a poly-sized circuit Q, such that Q(U(X )) =
D 1 and Q(U({0, 1}κ)) = D 2, where U(X ) and U({0, 1}κ) denote the uniform
distribution on X and the uniform distribution on {0, 1}κ, respectively. As U(X )
and U({0, 1}κ) are quantum-computationally indistinguishable, and Q is poly-
sized, it follows that Q(U(X )) and Q(U({0, 1}κ)) are quantum-computationally
indistinguishable, and therewith, D 1
q
≈ D 2.
A last change to the simulation is applied by running π(force,random) hon-
estly instead of enforcing a uniformly random pk ∈ {0, 1}κ. Let D 3 denote
the distribution obtained after this change. As given in Definition 5, real runs
of π(force,random) and runs enforcing a uniformly random value are quantum-
computationally indistinguishable. Using a similar argument as above, where
Q is the part of the protocol following the run of π(force,random), we get that
D 2
q
≈ D 3. Finally by transitivity, it follows that D 0
q
≈ D 3. The observation that
D 0 is the distribution of the simulation and D 3 is the actual distribution of the
real protocol concludes the first part of the proof.
We now argue the second part, i.e., if c 6= ⊥, then c = h, except with neg-
ligible probability. This follows from extractability of the commitment scheme
COMMITpk. Recall that, if pk ∈ X , then the probability that A′ can open any A to
a plaintext different from xtrsk(A) is at most (
3
4 )
σ when S is picked uniformly
at random and independent of A. The requirement on S is however guaranteed
(except with negligible probability) by the random flavor of the underlying proto-
col π(random,force) producing S. This concludes the proof of enforceability against
Alice, as given in Definition 5. 
11 Briefly, a hybrid argument is a proof technique to show that two (extreme) distri-
butions are computationally indistinguishable via proceeding through several (adja-
cent) hybrid distributions. If all adjacent distributions are pairwise computationally
indistinguishability, it follows by transitivity that the two end points are so as well.
We want to point out that we are not subject to any restrictions in how to obtain
the hybrid distributions as long as we maintain indistinguishability.
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Proof (Enforceability against Bob). To prove enforceability against cor-
rupted B′, we construct a simulator Bˆ′ as shown in Fig. 11. It is straightforward
to verify that the simulation always ensures that c = h, if B′ does not abort. How-
ever, we must explicitly argue that the simulation is quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from the real protocol.
Simulation Bˆ′ for pi(force,force):
1. Bˆ′ requests h from Fℓ−COIN and runs pi
(force,random) honestly with B′ to produce
a uniformly random public key pk ∈ {0, 1}κ.
2. Bˆ′ computes COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
= (A1, . . . ,AΣ) for uniformly random a
′, s ∈
F
σ and sends (A1, . . . , AΣ) to B
′.
3. Bˆ′ receives b from B′.
4. Bˆ′ computes a = b⊕h. It then picks a uniformly random subset S ⊂ {1, . . . , Σ}
with |S| = σ, and lets a′|S be the σ messages committed to by A|S. Then,
it interpolates the unique polynomial f of degree at most (2σ − 1) for which
f(i) = a′i for i ∈ S and for which f(−i+1) = ai for i ∈ {1, . . . , Σ}\S. Finally,
it sends (f(1), . . . , f(Σ)) to B′.
5. During the run of pi(random,force), Bˆ′ enforces the challenge S.
6. Bˆ′ sends r|S to B
′.
7. Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
Figure 11. Simulation for Bob’s force in pi(force,force).
Indistinguishability follows by first arguing that the probability for pk /∈
{0, 1}κ \ X is negligible. This follows from X being negligible in {0, 1}κ and pk
produced with flavor random against B′ by π(force,random) being uniformly random
in {0, 1}κ, except with negligible probability.
Second, we have to show that if pk ∈ {0, 1}κ \ X , then the simulation is
quantum-computationally close to the real protocol. This can be shown via the
following hybrid argument. Let D 0 be the distribution of the output of the sim-
ulation and let D 1 be the distribution of the output of the simulation where
we send all a′i for all i = {1, . . . , Σ} at the end of Step (4.). Since commit-
ments by commitpk are unconditionally hiding in case of pk ∈ {0, 1}κ \ X ,
commitments by COMMITpk are unconditionally hiding as well. Furthermore,
both a′ and a are uniformly random, so we obtain statistical closeness between
(a′, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
) and (a, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
). Note further that distri-
butions D 0 and D 1 can be produced by a poly-sized circuit applied to either
(a′, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
) or (a, COMMIT pk
(
a′, (s, r)
)
, it holds that D 0
q
≈ D 1.
Now, let D 2 be the distribution obtained by not simulating the opening via
the trapdoor, but instead doing it honestly to the value committed to, i.e. (a′, r).
We still use the challenge S from the forced run of π(random,force) though. How-
ever, for uniformly random challenges, real runs are quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from simulated runs, and we get D 1
q
≈ D 2.
Next, let D 3 be the distribution of the output of the simulation where we run
π(random,force) honestly instead of enforcing outcome S. We then use the honestly
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produced S′ in the proof in Step (6.) instead of the enforced S. We can do this,
as we modified the process leading to D 2 towards an honest opening without
any trapdoor, so we no longer need to enforce a particular challenge. Under
the assumption that π(random,force) is enforceable against B′, and observing that
real runs are quantum-computationally indistinguishable from runs enforcing
uniformly random outcomes, we obtain D 2
q
≈ D 3.
It follows by transitivity D 0
q
≈ D 3, and we conclude the proof by observing
that after our changes, the process producing D 3 is the real protocol. This
concludes the proof of enforceability against Bob, according to Definition 5 with
switched sides. 
C Proof of Theorem 3 (Zero-Knowledge Proof of
Knowledge)
Completeness is obvious. A honest party A, following the protocol with (x,w) ∈
R and any valid encoding e, will be able to open all commitments in the positions
specified by any challenge s. Honest Bob then outputs J(x, s, es) = success.
Proof (Security against dishonest Alice). To prove security in case of cor-
rupted A′, we construct a simulator Aˆ′ that simulates a run of the actual protocol
with A′ and FZKPK(R). The proof is then twofold. First, we show indistinguishabil-
ity between the distributions of simulation and protocol. And second, we verify
that the extractability property of the underlying witness encoding scheme (see
Definition 7) implies a negligible knowledge error. Note that if A′ sends abort
at any point during the protocol, Aˆ′ sends some input (x′, w′) /∈ R to FZKPK(R)
to obtain output (x, j) with j = abort, and the simulation halts. Otherwise, the
simulation proceeds as shown in Fig. 12.
Simulation Aˆ′ for ZKPK(R) :
1. Aˆ′ samples a random key pk along with the extraction key sk. Then it enforces
pk as output from Fκ−COIN
2. When Aˆ′ receives x and (E1, . . . , En) from A
′, it extracts e =
(xtrsk(E1), . . . , xtrsk(En)).
3. Aˆ′ completes the simulation by following the protocol honestly. If any opening
of A′ is incorrect, Aˆ′ aborts. Otherwise, Aˆ′ inputs
(
x,D(x, e)
)
to FZKPK(R) and
receives (x, j) back. Aˆ′ outputs the final state of A′ as output in the simulation.
Figure 12. Simulation against dishonest Alice.
Note that the only difference between the real protocol and the simulation is
that Aˆ′ uses a random public key pk sampled along with an extraction key sk,
instead of a uniformly random pk ∈ {0, 1}κ. It then enforces Fκ−COIN to hit pk.
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However, by assumption on the commitment keys and by the properties of the
ideal coin-flip functionality, the transcripts of simulation and protocol remain
quantum-computationally indistinguishable under these changes.
Next, we analyze the output in more detail. It is clear that whenever honest
B would output abort in the actual protocol, also Aˆ′ aborts, namely, if A′ does
deviate in the last steps of protocol and simulation, respectively. Furthermore,
Aˆ
′ accepts if and only if (x,D(x, e)) ∈ R or in other words, the judgment of the
functionality is positive, denoted by jF = success.
It is therefore only left to prove that the case of jF = abort but jJ = success
is negligible, where the later denotes the judgment of algorithm J(x, s, es) as in
the protocol. In that case, we have (x,D(x, e)) /∈ R. This means that w is not ex-
tractable from D(x, e), which in turn implies that (xtrsk(E1), . . . , xtrsk(En)) =
e is not admissible. Thus, there are no two distinct challenges s and s′, in which
A
′ could correctly open her commitment to e. It follows by contradiction that
there exists at most one challenge s which A′ can answer. We produce s ∈ {0, 1}σ
uniformly at random, from which we obtain an acceptance probability of at most
2−σ. Thus, we conclude the proof with negligible knowledge error, as desired. 
Proof (Security against dishonest Bob). To prove security in case of
corrupted B′, we construct simulator Bˆ′ as shown in Fig. 13. Our aim is to verify
that this simulation is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the real
protocol. The key aspect will be the simulatability guarantee of the underlying
witness encoding scheme, according to Definition 8.
Simulation Bˆ′ for ZKPK(R) :
1. Bˆ′ invokes Fκ−COIN to receive a uniformly random pk.
2. Bˆ′ samples a uniformly random challenge s ∈ {0, 1}σ and computes ts ←
Eˆ(x, s). Bˆ′ then computes commitments Ei as follows: For all i ∈ S(s), it
commits to the previously sampled ts via Ei = COMMIT pk
(
ti, ri
)
. For all other
positions i ∈ S¯ (where S¯ = {1, . . . , n} \ S(s)), it commits to randomly chosen
values t′i ∈R {0, 1}, i.e. Ei = COMMIT pk
(
t′i, ri
)
. It sends x and all Ei to B
′.
3. Bˆ′ forces Fσ−COIN to hit s.
4. Bˆ′ opens Ei to ti for all i ∈ S(s), i.e. to all ts.
5. Bˆ′ outputs whatever B′ outputs.
Figure 13. Simulation against dishonest Bob.
The proof proceeds via a hybrid argument. Let D 0 be the distribution of the
simulation as described in Fig. 13. Let D 1 be the distribution obtained from
the simulation but with the following change: We inspect FZKPK(R) to get a valid
witness w for instance x, and let e← E(x,w, r′) be the corresponding encoding.
Note that this is possible as a thought experiment for any adjacent distribution
in a hybrid argument. From e we then use bits es for the same S(s) as previously,
instead of bits ts sampled by Eˆ(x, s). All other steps are simulated as before.
By the simulatability of the encoding scheme (Definition 8), it holds that the
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bits ts in D 0 and the bits es in D 1 have the same distribution. Thus, we obtain
D 0 = D 1.
We further change the simulation in that we compute the bits in all positions
i ∈ S¯ by ei of the encoding e defined in the previous step. Again, all other steps of
the simulation remain unchanged. Let D 2 denote the new distribution. The only
difference now is that for i ∈ S¯, the commitments Ei are to the bits ei of a valid e
and not to uniformly random bits t′i. This, however, is quantum-computationally
indistinguishable to B′ for pk ∈R {0, 1}κ, as COMMIT is quantum-computationally
hiding towards B′. Note that pk is guaranteed to be random by an honest call
to Fκ−COIN and recall that we do not have to open the commitments in these
positions. Hence, we get that D 1
q
≈ D 2.
Note that after the two changes, leading to distributions D 1 and D 2, the
commitment step and its opening now proceed as in the actual protocol, namely,
we commit to the bits of e ← E(x, e, r′) and open the subset corresponding
to S(s). The remaining difference to the real protocol is the enforcement of
challenge s, whereas s is chosen randomly in the protocol. Now, let D 3 be the
distribution of the modified simulation, in which we implement this additional
change of invoking Fσ−COIN honestly and then open honestly to the resulting
s. Note that both processes, i.e., first choosing a random s and then enforcing
it from Fσ−COIN, or invoking Fσ−COIN honestly and receiving a random s, result
in a uniformly random distribution on the output of Fσ−COIN. Thus, we obtain
D 2 = D 3.
By transitivity, we conclude that D 0
q
≈ D 3, and therewith, that the simu-
lation is quantum-computationally indistinguishable from the actual protocol.

D Proof of Corollary 3 (Two-Party Function Evaluation)
Proof (Security against dishonest Alice). If A′ is corrupted, Aˆ′ uses the
proof of knowledge to learn her x1 inside commitment X1. Then Aˆ
′ inputs x1 to
FfSFE as A
′’s input and receives y = f(x1, x2). Now, Aˆ
′ invokes Sf
Aˆ′,Bˆ
with input x1
and y. This, in particular, yields randomness r1 and is quantum-computationally
indistinguishable from a real run of protocol Πf
A′,B. Furthermore, the simulated
transcript contains all messages sent by Bˆ. Next, Aˆ′ uses the proof of knowledge
to learn A′’s s1 inside commitment S1. Then Aˆ
′ enforces challenge s′1 such that
s′1 = s1 ⊕ r1, and thereby forces A
′ to use r1 in the following.
Aˆ
′ now runs Πf
A′,B with A
′. Whenever it is the turn of Bˆ to send a message, Aˆ′
sends the next message obtained already by Sf
Aˆ′,Bˆ
. Whenever it is the turn of A′
to send a message m, Aˆ′ checks whether it coincides with the message obtained
already by Sf
Aˆ′,Bˆ
. Note that by construction her only consistent message really
is the message obtained previously. In case of inconsistency, A′ will fail in her
following proof of knowledge, where she must prove that m is consistent with x1
in X1, s1 in S1, and where r1 = s1 ⊕ s′1 with r1 obtained from S
f
Aˆ′,Bˆ
. Hence, if
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A
′ does not send an inconsistent m and thereby make the protocol fail, then the
transcript of this simulation is consistent with the previous invocation of Sf
Aˆ′,Bˆ
.
In that case, Aˆ′ inputs ⊤ as second input to FfSFE, which outputs y as final result.
Otherwise, the input is ⊥, yielding output ⊥ from FfSFE and modeling the case
where a wrong m makes A′ fail in the proof of knowledge.
Therefore, the only difference between the simulation with FfSFE and the real
procedure Π
SFE(f)
A′,B is A
′’s views, simulated by Sf
Aˆ′,Bˆ
and actually produced by
Πf
A′,B, respectively. These views, however, are by assumption quantum-computationally
indistinguishable. 
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